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We here present the rate analysis and a proof of principle realization of a device-independent
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol requiring the lowest detection efficiency necessary to
achieve a secure key compared to device-independent protocols known so far. The protocol is based
on non-maximally entangled state and its experimental realization has been performed by two-
photon bipartite entangled states. The improvement with respect to protocols involving maximally
entangled states has been estimated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) represents an un-
conditional secure way to share a secret key between two
authenticated users, usually called Alice and Bob. Pho-
tons are the ideal candidates for QKD implementations
due to their low interaction with the environment; more-
over, they can be easily transmitted over long distances
with optical fibers [1–3] or free-space links [4–10]. Secu-
rity of the key is typically proven by using trusted prepa-
ration and measurement devices (for a review on QKD
security and experimental implementations, see [11]). In
the last years, great effort have been devoted to the so
called Device-Independent QKD (DI-QKD), aiming at
the demonstration of the security when the measuring
devices are completely untrusted and their working mech-
anism is not known to the users. The key ingredient for
DI-QKD is the exploitation of entangled states shared
between the two users: by violating a Bell inequality, it
is possible to prove the secrecy of the obtained key.
The DI-QKD offers the advantage that security is in-
dependent of the practical details of the implementa-
tion. Indeed, the violation of a Bell inequality certifies
the secrecy of the transmission, allowing Alice and Bob
even to use devices directly provided by Eve. The vi-
olation of a Bell inequality without any additional as-
sumption requires a very high global detection efficiency,
from the source to the detectors. It is well known that
non-maximally entangled states offer an advantage, in
terms of required detection efficiency, with respect to
maximally entangled state to violate the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [12, 13]. Recently,
detection loophole-free violations of the CHSH inequal-
ity by non-maximally entangled photons were indeed re-
ported [14, 15]. Non-maximally entangled states were
proven to be also useful for several bipartite Bell inequal-
ities [16] and for quantum steering [17].
The ent-B92 protocol, a version of the B92 proto-
col [18] realized with non-maximally entangled states,
was proposed in [19]. We here propose its generaliza-
tion and analyze its secret key rate when detection inef-
ficiencies are taken into account. We moreover present a
proof-of-principle realization of the protocol by exploit-
ing non-maximally entangled states produced by spon-
taneous parametric down conversion. With proof-of-
principle we mean that we demonstrated that it is in
principle possible to realize the DI protocol with our ex-
perimental generated state if higher detection efficiencies
were used. Due to the efficiency of our setup (about
10%) it was not possible to achieve a complete DI-QKD
demonstration. However, by using eq. (13) (see below),
we will predict the experimental value of the Bell param-
eter achievable with our experimentally generated state
in case of a given efficiency η. By this prediction we will
estimate the achievable rate of our DI-QKD protocols.
We will show that the protocols here presented allow
a DI-QKD security with the lowest required threshold
detection efficiency to date.
II. GENERALIZED ent-B92 PROTOCOL
Let’s consider Alice and Bob sharing the following non-
maximally entangled state:
|Φ(θ)〉AB = cos θ
2
|H〉A|H〉B + sin
θ
2
|V 〉A|V 〉B , (1)
where |H〉 and |V 〉 are the horizontal and vertical po-
larization states and 0 < θ ≤ pi/2. The parameter θ
is monotonically related to the amount of entanglement,
since the concurrence [20] is given by C = sin θ.
The protocol works as follow: Alice measures with low
probability p 1 its photon along the A1 ≡ {|a1〉, |a¯1〉}
basis, with |a1〉 = |V 〉 and |a¯1〉 = |H〉. With high prob-
ability 1 − p she measures along the A0 ≡ {|a0〉, |a¯0〉}
basis, where |a0〉 = 1√2 (|H〉 + |V 〉) and |a¯0〉 is its or-
thogonal state; Bob randomly and with probability 1/2
measures the incoming states in the B0 or B1 basis where
Bk = {|bk〉, |bk〉} and
|bk〉 = sin ϕ
2
|H〉 − (−1)k cos ϕ
2
|V 〉 ,
|b¯k〉 = cos ϕ
2
|H〉+ (−1)k sin ϕ
2
|V 〉 .
(2)
The results from Alice’s A0 basis measurements are used
as bits of the raw key together with Bob’s results, while
those from the A1 basis will be used to perform a test
against the eavesdropper attack, as in the uninformative
states B92 QKD protocol (us-B92) introduced in [21].
On Alice side, the states |a0〉 and |a¯0〉 correspond to bits
0 and 1 respectively. Upon obtaining the state |bk〉 Bob
decodes Alice’s bit as j = k ⊕ 1 (the symbol ⊕ means
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2“addition modulo 2”) and labels the result as conclusive;
on the contrary, upon obtaining the state |b¯k〉, Bob labels
the result as inconclusive. The probability of a conclusive
event is given by Pc =
1
2 (1− cos θ cosϕ), independent on
Alice measurements. The sifted key is obtained by se-
lecting the conclusive results corresponding to Alice’s A0
measurements. The ent-B92 protocol of [19] corresponds
to the choice ϕ = θ.
The main problem of a fully DI-QKD protocol is re-
lated to the so called detection loophole, namely the fact
that the photon detection is inefficient and, if the de-
tectors are not trusted, an eavesdropper can exploit this
inefficiency to gain information on the key. In the next
section we will show how to extract a secure key in the
device-independent scenario in presence of detection (and
transmission) inefficiencies.
III. KEY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section we will derive the secret key rate (see
equation (9)) of the generalized ent-B92 protocol in case
of detection inefficiencies, improving the results obtained
in [19].
Let’s consider a transmission of N pairs in which Alice
chooses the A0 basis and Bob chooses with probability 12
the basis B0 or B1. The ±1 outputs of Alice’s measure-
ments correspond to bits 1 and 0 of the sifted key. The
overall efficiencies (including transmission and detection
efficiencies) are given by ηA and ηB and Alice and Bob
must decide a strategy to deal with non-detection events.
On Bob’s side, only +1 outputs, the so called conclusive
outcomes, are taken into account to build the key: thus,
on Bob side, non-detection event will be associated to
−1 output (corresponding to non-conclusive outcomes).
Then, all the Alice’s bits corresponding to non-conclusive
Bob outcomes, can be simply discarded as it is usually
done in the sifting phase of the BB84 protocol. On the
other side, when Alice measures in the A0 basis and does
not obtain physical detection, she randomly chooses an
outcome: whatever value she decides to output, the bit
will enter into the key. Alice thus assigns to non-detection
events the |a0〉 or |a¯0〉 outcome with 1/2 probability in
this case.
Due to inefficiencies, Bob receives NPcηB conclusive
counts. After the sifting phase, Alice stringAc and Bob’s
string Bc consists of NPcηB bits. In Ref [19] (see in
particular eq. (11) and (12)), the secure key rate – the
ratio between secure bits and the overall sent pairs –
is given in term of the quantum bit error rate Qc and
the Clauser-Horne (CH) parameter SCH = P (a1, b1) +
P (a0, b1) + P (a1, b0)− P (a0, b0)− P (a1)− P (b1) [12] as
r˜ = ηAηBPc [1− h2(Qc)− log2 f(SCH)] , (3)
where
f(SCH) = 1 +
√
1− 4SCH − 4S2CH . (4)
and h2(x) is the binary entropy given by h2(x) =
−x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x). The rate is derived under
the assumption that the measurement devices are mem-
oryless. In the previous expression P (ai, bj) is the joint
probability that Alice measures the state |ai〉 and Bob de-
tects the state |bi〉, while P (a1) and P (b1) are the proba-
bilities that Alice and Bob respectively measure |a1〉 and
|b1〉, regardless of what is measured by the other user.
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) Qc, defined as the
ratio of the number of errors over the number of conclu-
sive outcomes, must be evaluated over the sifted strings
Ac and Bc.
By using a technique introduced in [22], Alice and Bob
can improve the secure key rate: they will perform a
post-selection on Ac and Bc, by selecting only the bits
in which also Alice obtained a physical detection. We
called Aps and Bps the post-selected Alice’s and Bob’s
strings, with length NPcηAηB .
The length of the secure key can be bounded by [23]
` ≥ Hmin(Bps|E)−H(Bps|Aps) , (5)
where Hmin(B
ps|E) is the min-entropy of Bps condi-
tioned on Eve’s information. As usual H(Bps|Aps) =
NPcηBηAh2(Qps) is related to the classical error cor-
rection protocol between the Aps and Bps strings. In
the previous expression Qps is the QBER on the post-
selected data, and, its theoretical value Qpsth in the case
of no channel or measurement errors, is given by :
Qpsth =
1− cos(θ − ϕ)
2− 2 cos θ cosϕ . (6)
The choice ϕ = θ, used in the ent-B92 protocol, gives
null QBER. We will see that this choice doesn’t always
represent the optimal choice for the secure key rate.
As demonstrated in [22], by using the chain rule and
the data-processing inequality for smooth min-entropy
[23, 24], it is possible to bound Eve’s information on the
sifted bits by using her information on Bc:
Hmin(B
ps|E) ≥ Hmin(Bc|E)−NPcηB(1− ηA) , (7)
where NPcηB(1 − ηA) is the difference between the Bc
and the Bps string length.
As shown in [25], the min-entropy can be related to
the maximal probability of guessing the key bits, namely
Hmin(B
c|E) = −NPcηB log2 Pguess(b|E) . (8)
By using the results of [26], the probability of
guessing the bits can be related to the Bell in-
equality by Pguess(b|E) ≤ f(SCH)2 . The final se-
cure key length can be thus written as ` ≥
NPcηB [ηA(1− h(Qps))− log2 f(SCH)] and the final rate
r = `/N becomes
r = ηBPc [ηA(1− h2(Qps))− log2 f(SCH)] . (9)
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FIG. 1. Theoretical secure key rate r for the generalized ent-
B92 protocol, in case of perfect detection efficiencies.
As usual, in the secure rate formula, the h2(Q
ps) term
corresponds to the bits used for error correction, while
the log2 contribution is related to Eve’s knowledge on
the key and the required compression in the privacy am-
plification stage. The violation of the CH inequality
SCH ≤ 0 [12] is a test against the local-realism of quan-
tum physics: it can be trivially checked that, when the
inequality is not violated, the secure rate (9) is zero1.
In case of perfect efficiencies, the theoretical value
of SCH for the non-maximally entangled state (1) and
the measurement defined in (2) is given by SCH(θ, ϕ) =
1
2 (cosϕ + sin θ sinϕ − 1). The choice ϕ = arctan(sin θ)
leads to the maximum achievable violation with the state
(1), namely SmaxCH (θ) =
1
2 (
√
sin2 θ + 1 − 1). It is worth
noting that considering a trusted measurement device is
equivalent to taking perfect efficiencies, namely ηA = 1
and/or ηB = 1. In fact, if the device is trusted, we
can safely consider only the detected events. In this
way, we can have three possible scenarios: full DI-QKD
when the actual efficiencies are considered, one-side de-
vice independent-QKD (1SDI-QKD)[22] in which only
one of the two devices (Alice or Bob) is trusted, and stan-
dard QKD with both trusted devices. In case of standard
QKD (corresponding to ηA = ηB = 1), the achievable
rate with the ent-B92 protocol (corresponding to ϕ = θ),
is shown in Fig. 1 with the maximum rate obtained for
θ ' 65.28◦. By using the angle that maximizes the vio-
lation of the Bell inequality (ϕ = arctan(sin θ)) it is pos-
sible to improve the rate when θ >∼ 71.62◦ (see Fig. 1).
More generally, it is possible to numerically optimize the
value of the parameter ϕ = ϕ?(θ) in function of θ to max-
imize the achievable rate, as shown with dashed line in
Fig. 1. Note that, whenever ϕ 6= θ, the theoretical QBER
is not vanishing: however, the non vanishing QBER can
be compensated by a larger violation of the CH inequal-
ity, allowing more secrecy in the privacy amplification
stage. It is clear that, when Alice and Bob have trusted
devices (corresponding to the fair sampling assumption
of non-locality tests), the ent-B92 protocol cannot offer
1 If the key rate r obtained in (9) is negative, no secure key can
be distilled.
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FIG. 2. (top) Scheme of the generalized ent-B92 scheme.
(bottom) Experimental setup used for the generation of the
non-maximally entangled state and the realization of the pro-
tocol.
advantages with respect to the entangled version of the
BB84 protocol [26, 27]. In fact, in this case, the secure
key rate of ent-B92 is always lower than the BB84, given
by rBB84 = 1 − 2h2(Q). As we will see, the advantages
come when one (or both) device is not trusted: in this
case, the lower threshold detection required by the (gen-
eralized) ent-B92 protocol to violate the CH inequality,
gives considerable improvement of the secure key rate
with respect to protocols based on maximally entangled
states.
The rate achieved in (9) on the post-selected data can
be compared to the one obtained without post-selection
(3), with QBER Qc evaluated over all conclusive events.
Since Alices assigns to non-detection events the |a1〉
or |a¯1〉 outcomes with 1/2 probability, in this case the
QBER of the sifted key will be
Qc = ηAQ
ps +
1− ηA
2
. (10)
It is easy to show that the rate r˜ (3) is lower than the
rate r (9) achievable with the post-selection technique for
any ηA < 1 while r˜ = r when ηA = 1.
It is also useful to compare the result obtained in (9)
to the one obtained with the post-selection technique in
[22] using the usual DI-QKD protocol of [26] implemented
with maximally entangled states (the entangled version
of the BB84 protocol):
r′ = ηAηB(1− h2(Qps))− log2 f(SCH) . (11)
The difference from r and r′ arises from the fact that
in the BB84 protocol the key is obtained by using the
results of Bob in a single basis, while in the generalized
ent-B92 protocol the key is obtained by keeping the Bob’s
conclusive results in the basis B0 and B1.
4IV. PROOF OF PRINCIPLE REALIZATION
In this section we present a proof of principle realiza-
tion of the protocols above described. As anticipated
in the introduction, we will not present a complete DI-
QKD demonstration due to the low detection efficien-
cies measured in our setup. By generating a two-photon
non-maximally entangled state by spontaneous paramet-
ric down conversion, we will demonstrate that it is in
principle possible to realize the DI protocol with our ex-
perimental generated state if higher detection efficiencies
were used. We first describe the results obtained in a
trusted scenario (standard QKD) in order to test our en-
tanglement source and then analyze what can be achieved
in a DI framework.
Our source of non-maximally entangled states, shown
in Fig. 2, is given by two overlapped Type-I non-linear
BBO crystals shined by a pulsed UV laser at 405nm.
The two spontaneous parametric down converted pho-
tons are emitted at 810nm. The two crystals have the
optical axis rotated by 90◦: the first crystal generates
the |HH〉 pairs, while the second crystal generates the
|V V 〉 pairs. By using a pump laser with polarization
cos θ2 |V 〉p+ sin θ2 |H〉p the non-maximally entangled state
(1) can be generated. By varying the linear polarization
on the pump laser it is possible to change the relative con-
tribution of the |HH〉 and |V V 〉 terms in the generated
state. The UV laser has pulse duration of about 10ps
and 76MHz repetition rate. Due to the long coherence
time of the pump laser, it is not necessary to compensate
the temporal walk-off in the BBO crystals. We note that,
by this protocols, Bob does not need to project into the
|bk〉 states, since they don’t appear in the CH inequality
neither are used in the sifted key generation. Bob mea-
surements can be thus restricted to the positive-operator
valued measure (POVM) Π0 =
1
2 |b0〉〈b0|, Π1 = 12 |b1〉〈b1|
and Πinconc = 1 −Π0−Π1. From the experimental point
of view the Bob measurement can be simply represented
by a beam splitter and two polarizers.
As said, we tested our source by measuring the Bell pa-
rameter SCH and the achievable secure key rate in case
of trusted measurement devices. In figure 3 we show
the experimental value of SCH and the secure key rate
r in function of the entanglement parameter θ. If the
obtained rate r is below zero, no secure key can be ex-
tracted. In order to take into account imperfections in
the setup, the experimental generated state can be ex-
pressed by the following noise model:
ρexp = (1− pc − pw)|Φ(θ)〉〈Φ(θ)|+ pcρc + pw 1
4
. (12)
In the previous equation the state ρc is given by ρc =
cos2 θ2 |HH〉〈HH| + sin2 θ2 |V V 〉〈V V | and pc (pw) repre-
sent the amount of colored (white) noise. Dashed line
in Fig. 3 represent the theoretical value of the SCH pa-
rameter and the secure rate r obtained by the state (12)
with pw = 0.007 and pc = 0.015, with good agreement
between the model and the obtained results. To further
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FIG. 3. (left) Experimental value of the parameter SCH and
corresponding errors for the ent-B92 (blu circles) and the
ϕ = arctan(sin θ) protocol (red stars). (right) Experimen-
tal key rates for the two protocols with trusted measurement
devices. Continuous and dashed lines refer to theoretical pre-
dictions corresponding to perfect state generation and noise
model (12) respectively.
validate our noise model we present in B its prediction
for the threshold detection efficiencies required for the
violation of the Bell inequality.
Let us now analyze what can be achieved in a DI frame-
work. We calculated the overall detection efficiency of
our system by evaluating the ratio between the mea-
sured coincidences and the single counts, thus taking
into account transmission, coupling into fibers and de-
tection losses. Since the measured detection efficiency
is about 10% for both Alice and Bob we cannot achieve
DI secure key rate. Nevertheless, we can estimate the
key rate achievable with given detection efficiencies ηA
and ηB . Indeed, by assuming that probabilities P (ai, bj)
are related to the probabilities p(aibj) normalized on the
post-selected events in which Alice and Bob have a coin-
cidence, we can predict the CH parameter as (see A for
its derivation):
5SCH =ηAηB [p(a1b1) +
1
2
p(a0b1) + p(a1b0)− 1
2
p(a0b0) +
1
2
p(a¯0b0)− 1
2
p(a¯0b1)]
− ηA[p(a1b0) + p(a1b¯0)]− ηB
2
[p(a0b1) + p(a¯0b1) + p(a0b0) + p(a¯0b0)] (13)
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FIG. 4. Key rates achievable for (left) the full DI-QKD case
(ηA = ηB = η) and for (right) the 1SDI-QKD (ηA = 1) in
function of the detection efficiency. For 1SDI-QKD the rate
is the the amount of secure bits over the detected Alice bits.
With continuous lines we indicate the theoretical rates achiev-
able with the non-maximally entangled state |Φ(θ)〉. With
dashed lines we indicate the predicted rates obtained by us-
ing the noise model of eq. (12), while with green squares we
indicate the rates achievable when the experimentally mea-
sured probabilities are used to evaluate eq. (13).
The previous expression can be derived under the con-
dition that on the A1, B0 and B1 basis, non-detection
events are associated to −1 outputs, namely to the states
|a¯1〉, |b¯0〉 and |b¯1〉 while the states |a0〉 and |a¯0〉 are ran-
domly chosen in case of non-detection in the A0 basis.
Then, by measuring the probabilities appearing in
equation (13), we can estimate the value of the Bell pa-
rameter in case of arbitrary efficiencies ηA and ηB and
thus predict the secure key rate achievable with our ex-
periment states when more efficient detectors are used.
It is worth noticing that overall efficiencies of the order
of 75% were already demonstrated in the lab by using
superconducting TES detectors in [14, 15].
Let’s first consider full DI-QKD with Alice and Bob
having the same efficiency ηA = ηB = η. For each value
of η is possible to optimize the value of θ (or θ and ϕ)
that maximizes the key rate for the ent-B92 (or gener-
alized ent-B92) protocol: in figure 4(left) we illustrate
the achievable key rate in function of the detection effi-
ciency for the ent-B92 and the generalized protocol. We
note that positive secure key rate can be obtained up to
an efficiency of 90.57%, improving the results of 90.9%
and 91.1% obtained respectively in [28] and [22]. We
also show the rates that can be achieved with our exper-
imental generated state. In particular, we indicate with
dashed lines the predicted rates achievable by using the
theoretical noisy state of eq. (12) to calculate the prob-
abilities appearing in eq. (13). With green squares we
report the rates achievable when the probabilities that
we have experimentally measured are used to evaluate
eq. (13). Such rates are below the rates achievable with
a perfect non-maximally entangled state |Φ(θ)〉 due to
the presence of decoherence and white noise causing a
decrease of the state purity. Our measurements indicate
that it is necessary to generate states with high purity in
order to reach low detection efficiencies.
Great improvement with respect to state-of-the-art re-
sults are obtained by considering one-side DI-QKD in
which Alice device is trusted, corresponding to ηA = 1
in the secure key rate (9) and in the predicted Bell
parameter (13). In this case the rate r correspond
to the fraction of secure bits over the Alice detected
bits. In figure 4(right), we show the achievable key
rate in function of the detection efficiency in the one-
side DI-QKD case. For the ent-B92 protocol, the secure
key rate (without experimental imperfection) becomes
r = ηBPc [1− log2 f(SCH)], which is positive whenever
the Bell inequality SCH ≤ 0 is violated. Note that the
same rate can be obtained by the original analysis of the
ent-B92 protocol [19] applied for the one-side case. We
remark that it is possible to obtain positive secure key
rate up to a detection efficiency of 50%, improving the
result obtained in [22] in which an efficiency greater than
65.9% is required for key generation. Also in this case we
show the rate predicted by our experimental data: these
data shows again that, in order to fully exploit the prop-
erties of low entangled states, it is necessary to generate
quantum state with low amount of noise.
Our result closes the gap, from the theoretical point
of view, between one-side Bell inequality (also known as
steering inequality [22, 29, 30]) and key generation in
1SDI-QKD, since in our protocol the violation of the Bell
inequality corresponds to a positive secure key rate. For
fully DI-QKD still remains a gap, which is due to differ-
ence between the threshold of η > 82.8% needed for a
violation of the CHSH inequality [13] and the efficiency
required for the security of DI-QKD, namely η > 90.57%.
6V. CONCLUSIONS
We have derived an efficient key rate for the (gener-
alized) ent-B92 protocol in case of detection inefficien-
cies. We experimentally tested our result with two-
photon non-maximally entangled states with good agree-
ment between theory and experiment. The protocol is
able to achieve secure key rate with the lowest detection
efficiency to date. While the improvement for the full
DI-QKD case is small and has mainly theoretical rele-
vance (we lowered the threshold efficiency from 90.9% to
90.57%), great improvement is obtained in the one-side
DI-QKD: it is possible to achieve positive secure key rate
up to 50% efficiency, to be compared with the state of
the art result of 65.9% [22].
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7Appendix A: Predicted Bell parameter in case of detection inefficiencies
Let’s consider the Clauser-Horne (CH) parameter
SCH = P (a1, b1) + P (a0, b1) + P (a1, b0)− P (a0, b0)− P (a1)− P (b1) , (A1)
with the probabilities P ’s normalized over all generated pairs. In case of detection inefficiencies ηA and ηB we can
predict the values of each probability. In the generalized ent-B92 protocol, non-detection events are associated to the
states |a¯1〉, |b¯0〉 and |b¯1〉 when the observables A1, B0 and B1 are respectively measured. Then, the probabilities P ’s
can be predicted as
P (a1, b1) = ηAηBp(a1b1) , P (a1) = ηAp(a1) = ηA[p(a1b0) + p(a1b¯0)] ,
P (a1, b0) = ηAηBp(a1b0) , P (b1) = ηBp(b1) = ηB [p(a0b1) + p(a¯0b1)] ,
(A2)
where p(aibj) are the probabilities normalized on the post-selected events in which Alice and Bob have a coincidence.
On the other side, when measuring the A0 observable, it is necessary to remember that, in the case of non-detection,
the state |a0〉 is chosen with probability 12 . Then
P (a0, b0) = ηAηBp(a0b0) + (1− ηA)ηB 1
2
p(b0)
= ηAηBp(a0b0) + (1− ηA)ηB 1
2
[p(a0b0) + p(a¯0b0)] ,
P (a0, b1) = ηAηBp(a0b1) + (1− ηA)ηB 1
2
p(b1)
= ηAηBp(a0b1) + (1− ηA)ηB 1
2
[p(a0b1) + p(a¯0b1)] .
(A3)
By inserting equation (A2) and (A3) into (A1) we obtained the predicted Bell parameter as
SCH =ηAηB [p(a1b1) +
1
2
p(a0b1) + p(a1b0)− 1
2
p(a0b0) +
1
2
p(a¯0b0)− 1
2
p(a¯0b1)]
− ηA[p(a1b0) + p(a1b¯0)]− ηB
2
[p(a0b1) + p(a¯0b1) + p(a0b0) + p(a¯0b0)] . (A4)
Appendix B: Error model verification
As written in the main text, we used a noise model in order to take into account the possible noise sources in
our setup. The noise model takes into account two possible sources: the first is due to the effect of background
photons, modeled by the addition of a white noise 14 and corresponding to a depolarizing channel. The second is
due to a partial distinguishability of the |HH〉 and |V V 〉 events generated by the two SPDC crystals causing partial
decoherence: this effect is modeled by a colored noise ρc, corresponding to a phase damping channel [31]. Therefore,
the generated state can be expressed by the following model:
ρexp = (1− pc − pw)|Φ(θ)〉〈Φ(θ)|+ pcρc + pw 1
4
. (B1)
In the previous equation ρc = cos
2 θ
2 |HH〉〈HH| + sin2 θ2 |V V 〉〈V V | and pc (pw) represents the amount of colored
(white) noise. To further validate our noise model we checked the predictions of our model with the experimental
data for the threshold detection efficiencies.
Let’s consider the case ηA = ηB = η
th. From equation (6) of the main text, the threshold detection efficiency
required to violate the Bell inequality can be predicted to be
ηth =
p(a1b0) + p(a1b¯0) +
1
2p(a¯0b1) +
1
2p(a0b1) +
1
2p(a¯0b0) +
1
2p(a0b0)
p(a1b1) +
1
2p(a0b1) + p(a1b0)− 12p(a0b0) + 12p(a¯0b0)− 12p(a¯0b1)
(B2)
If ηA = 1 (corresponding to Alice trusted device), the Bob’s threshold detection efficiency ηB , can be be predicted to
be
ηthB =
p(a1b0) + p(a1b¯0)
p(a1b1) + p(a1b0)− p(a0b0)− p(a¯0b1) (B3)
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FIG. 5. Threshold detection efficiencies needed for the violation of the Bell inequality in the ηA = ηB = η case (left) and in the
ηA = 1 case (right). Continuous and Dashed lines respectively represent theoretical values obtained in case of no imperfection
and by using the noise model of eq. (B1). We also report the threshold achievable with a perfect maximally entangled state
(MES).
If Fig. 5 we show the theoretical prediction and the experimental values of ηth and ηthB . Continuous lines represent
theoretical prediction without imperfection, while dashed lines correspond to the prediction of the model (B1) with
pw = 0.007 and pc = 0.015. Also in this case, we have a good agreement between the model and the obtained results.
As the model predicts, when white noise is turned on, states with very low entanglement cannot offer advantages
with respect to states with larger entanglement. In order to full exploit the properties of low entangled states it is
necessary to generate quantum state with low amount of noise.
